Asian Military Review April/May 2010
Today, Special Forces operate in fields of conflict in the Middle East and Afghanistan which are potentially affected by Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. They face highly trained and motivated insurgent forces armed with weaponry supplied by sponsoring states, and less advanced, but no less effective, homemade weapons.
What we have here, it seems, is a failure to communicate
A federal grand jury has indicted Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on charges that he tried to blow up Detroit-bound Flight 253. There are six counts against the 23-year-old Nigerian, the most serious being the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, which potentially carries a life sentence. The terrorist group Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has claimed responsibility for the attack; the AQAP said that Abdulmutallab coordinated with group members.
American authorities knew for some time of the terrorist ties of a Nigerian man linked to Al-Qaida who tried to blow up a passenger jet before it landed in Detroit.
The son of a prominent Nigerian is charged with trying to destroy a transatlantic jet on Christmas Day. The suspect, 23-year-old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, say authorities, attempted to detonate explosives that had been sewn into his underpants and to destroy a Northwest Airlines passenger jet from Amsterdam as it landed in Detroit.
The attempt has opened up another chapter in airborne terrorist threats. The episode also exposed embarrassing deficiencies to communicate intelligence among agencies, leading to what President Obama has since called a “systemic failure.”
Indeed. There were more red flags being waved in this episode than at a parade in Beijing.
The accused man has since reportedly informed investigators that he was trained and equipped in Yemen by a group affiliated with Al-Qaida. The unclassified report just released by the Obama Administration has acknowledged that intelligence officials knew that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) wanted to attack the U.S. The British home secretary has noted the Nigerian had been placed on a U.K. watch list and was barred from entering Britain in 2009. Such information is routinely shared with U.S. authorities
The father of the accused had gone to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria to warn officials that his son was becoming radicalized. It turned out that Nigerian officials brought the father directly to the CIA station chief in Abuja on Nov. 19. The suspect was placed on a watch list maintained by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center. However Abdulmutallab’s visa to the U.S. wasn’t revoked, nor was he placed on the “no-fly” list.
There were plenty of other reasons, made especially clear in hindsight, to be suspicious: The suspect apparently paid cash, bought a one-way ticket and had no checked luggage for what was supposed to be an extended stay.
Abdulmutallab has since been charged with trying to destroy an aircraft “with a weapon of mass destruction,” He has reportedly admitted that his device was acquired in Yemen along with instructions on its use. A so-called weapon of mass destruction need not be a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon; it is defined as such because of its potential effects. Had the Detroit-bound aircraft blown up, the casualties in the air and on the ground might have have exceeded the total during the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
Failure to Connect the Dots
Much of the U.S. embarrassment stems from the fact that intelligence reporting in December about possible terrorist plots was not quickly shared quickly among relevant agencies, resulting in a tangled web of missed opportunities. The intelligence received at the time was interpreted as a garbled stream of information about a possible holiday-period plot against the U.S, originating in Pakistan. The State Dept. said that warnings about Abdulmutallab were made to U.S. counterterrorist agencies on November 20.
According to a necessarily anonymous intelligence official, if the “bits and pieces” of information been properly knitted together, the alleged attacker could have been placed on the no-fly list. “As everybody knows, terrorists often speak in coded language, especially when they think their communications might be intercepted… there were, to put it mildly, virtually no details at all. That happens.”
John Brennan, the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism remarked in early January: “There was no piece of intelligence that said, ‘This guy’s a terrorist. He’s going to get on a plane.’ No, not whatsoever.”
That is no doubt true. Still, as early as August, telephone intercepts alerted the CIA that someone called “the Nigerian” was involved in a planned attack. In November, the suspect’s father contacted the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria to warn officials about his son’s radical associations and noted that he had disappeared. As noted, the Border Agency in the U.K. rejected the suspect’s visa request to visit in May 2009. Abdulmutallab traveled from Lagos to Amsterdam to Detroit; by the time he reached Amsterdam, he had apparently been flagged in the U.S. consular database as being on the terrorist watch list.
And the long trail doesn’t end there. Reports have emerged of a high-level intelligence briefing in October 2009 warning of a new Al-Qaida tactic of hiding a bomb in an attacker’s underwear. A similar bomb had already been employed in August 2009, when there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt by an AQAP terrorist against Saudi Arabia’s director of counterterrorism, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.
Some American intelligence sources now believe that both this device and the Christmas Day explosive system were built by the same bomb-maker. Saudi officials initially thought the bomb had been secreted in the attacker’s anal cavity, as reported in Newsweek, but later determined it had likely been sewn into his underwear.
The failure to communicate could be caused by the culture and mentality of bureaucratic structures. Such bodies tend to breed a lack of what has been called lateral thinking. Bureaucracies are often unfriendly to intuitive, instinctive judgments. Officials find themselves embedded in static and inflexible working practices, where everything seems to take place behind closed doors.
There is no doubt that the complexities of databases and the number of agencies potentially involved also make it hard to see the forest for the trees. Some of the current calls for an internationally shared watch list available to embassy staff, immigration officials, border police and airport security staff would require new ways of information-sharing across borders.
The Explosive Device
Because the sewn-in device that was devised to take down the plane near Detroit contained pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a proven high-explosive, authorities concluded that it had likely been made by an accomplice. PETN is a component of Semtex, which has long been the favorite explosive of terrorists, most notably the IRA. It is is not only stable and very powerful in small amounts, but is also largely undetectable by most scanning machines currently in service.
This was the same explosive carried by the so-called “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid, an admitted Al-Qaida member who tried to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami shortly before Christmas in 2001.
The syringe recovered from the Nigerian suspect contained a glycol-based liquid explosive intended as a detonator, according to U.S. authorities. It failed to cause an explosion.
Only five days later in Mogadishu, there was an arrest of a Somali who allegedly attempted to carry a similar combination of chemicals, liquid and a syringe onto a flight bound for Djibouti and Dubai. Whether that attempt was connected to the Christmas Day bomber or a copycat incident, it heightened the state of security at airports around the world. The seizure of an intact device will be of great value for U.S. investigators investigating links between the two attempted attacks and a possible Al-Qaida command structure in Somalia and Yemen.
Problems with Whole-Body Scanning
Following the Christmas Day attempt by the “undie bomber,” the alarm went out for airports to speed up the installation of whole-body scanners to detect hidden materials on passengers. Those flying into the United States from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen will undergo intensive screening. At this point, the regulations do not apply to the U.K. and other European countries with a jihadi presence.
This reaction is akin to panicked response following the arrest in August 2006 of a group of British Muslim extremists who were convicted in 2009. They were charged with trying to smuggle liquid explosives on board 10 transatlantic aircraft. Controls were instantly imposed on the size of liquid bottles passengers were allowed to carry on board aircraft, restrictions that have remained in force to date.
Whole-body scanners have been tested at several airports. However, they do not reveal all forms of explosives and concealed packages, or certain chemicals or light plastics, or show under clothing or inside the body.Critics have raised concerns about what they call an unacceptable intrusion of passenger privacy; others have questioned whether the radiation the scanners emit is harmful.
Scanner technologies, such as Raman spectroscopy, can detect liquids and other novel substances. Yet, these are expensive. Whole-body X-ray scanners will pick up anything carried internally or externally, but may be impractical for mass screening at airports.
Meanwhile, there is available what might well be more effective screening method: nontechnological passenger profiling. Travelers can be analysed according to their appearance, behavior, itinerary and passport (there were several anomalies with the Nigerian suspect). Such tactics are used in Israeli airports, where inspectors often pay more attention to the passengers than to the smuggling of potential weapons. Sticking points elsewhere, however, include the legal liabilities of such tactics and political correctness, no small matter in the U.S.
Such profiling, more targeted and potentially more effective, requires highly trained individuals to make risk assessments of passengers as they arrive at the airport and determine which technology should be used for screening. Also vital is the integrity of the airport employees and authorities, as attested by the by the Somali bomb suspect who tried to bribe the team that detained him.
“It’s essential that we diagnose the problems quickly,” said President Obama. Unfortunately, that isn’t the first time that has been noted.
Author: Andy Oppenheimer
© 2010 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.
Military Periscope
Tehran pushes the limits of obfuscation
The Iranian elections, stirring up protests and a crackdown, have been dominating the recent news about that nation on the international scene, shifting attention from Tehran’s nuclear program.Yet, the evidence continues to grow that Tehran’s nuclear activities are proceeding apace, with possible military applications.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who won a second term in the disputed election, has ruled out negotiations on his country’s nuclear program. The U.S. and Israel in particular suspect Iran of using that program to develop atomic weapons. Tehran insists the technology is designed only for peaceful use.
Queries from IAEA
A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), published in late August, says the evidence of Iran’s alleged nuclear-weapon design research “is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed.” Tehran maintains that the evidence is forged, and the agency has demanded substantiation of that claim.
The information cited by the IAEA includes computer files and other records provided by Western nations on Iranian nuclear-weapon research. The evidence reportedly reveals that Tehran has carried out high-explosive (HE) experiments relevant to the complex detonation sequence of a nuclear weapon.
At least as significant is evidence concerning Iranian efforts to modify its Shahab missile so it can carry a nuclear warhead payload.
The IAEA continues to urge Tehran to provide more “substantive responses” to the dispute, specifically seeking access to Iran’s nuclear records. Tehran has persistently failed to implement the IAEA’s “Additional Protocol” – a legal document complementing safeguard agreements – which would allow agency inspectors extended access to Iran’s nuclear sites on short notice.
This is pertinent since the latest report had to be based on evidence supplied not from actual inspections but from other sources. This makes it more difficult to assess the true capabilities of the alleged Iranian quest for nuclear weapons. Iran’s tendency to lean towards non-compliance attracts even more suspicions about its nuclear activities.
The latest international watchdog report has been hindered by the lack of inspection evidence. Nevertheless, according to Philip Parham, Britain’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, the latest IAEA report “catalogues a litany of Iranian obfuscation and obstruction” and “makes clear that Iran continues willfully to fail to meet its legally binding international obligations.”
Iran’s Warhead Design
The HE design issue is uppermost in this “obfuscation.” Iran has admitted that it has experimented with the civil application of simultaneously functioning multiple detonators. This design element would be vital to a plutonium weapon, which detonates through implosion of carefully constructed, perfectly symmetrical high-explosive “lenses.”
The agency is still waiting for Iranian confirmation that such work is solely for civil and non-nuclear military purposes. The IAEA also wants clarification about the purpose of a visit by a foreign explosives expert.
Other aspects of Iran’s program with possible military applications also need to be explained. At issue in this regard are the procurement and research and development activities of Iran’s military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear-related, and the production of nuclear-related equipment and components by Iranian defense companies.
Enrichment and Heavy Water
In short, Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities or its work on heavy-water-related projects as required by the U.N. Security Council.
Yet, while the design issue remains disputed and enrichment progresses, the IAEA report does acknowledge that Iran has shown a degree of cooperation on its enrichment and processing activities, some of which are still under observation by the international watchdog. This is consistent with Iran’s strategy of cooperation mixed with obfuscation.
Although Iran has increased the capacity of its Natanz enrichment site, the number of operational centrifuges has fallen by around 400 from the 5,000 or so previously in use.
The IAEA says that Iran’s adding 1,000 centrifuges – bringing the Natanz total to 8,308 – has not increased uranium enrichment since those centrifuges are off-line, being repaired or upgraded. The production rate is said to remain at about 50 percent capacity.
Between November 2008 and the end of July, Iran put through the enrichment centrifuges 7,940 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). This is the material processed out of uranium ore as a vital preliminary stage before enrichment. This yielded 670 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU). Small amounts of UF6 were also fed into two experimental high-speed centrifuge cascades and – of considerable interest for the future of the enrichment program – into experimental next-generation machines.
Also of interest is Tehran’s late notification to the agency of the construction of new facilities – such as requested preliminary design information for a new plant to be built in Darkhovin – and design changes of existing facilities.
Weapons-design developments potentially hinge on progress in producing plutonium for warheads, which require a more complex design. After repeated IAEA requests, Iran permitted access to the IR-40 reactor at Arak. When that site is up and running, it will be able to produce deuterium oxide, or heavy water, which is vital for plutonium production. The plant is scheduled to become fully operational in 2011. It is now around 60 percent completed, with no reactor yet in operation.
Iran is still required to provide updated and more detailed design information about the nuclear fuel characteristics, fuel-handling and transfer equipment. It also is supposed to provide details on the nuclear material accountancy and control system, which has been a noted area of past non-compliance. In the absence of inspections, the IAEA has used satellite imagery to monitor the status of the heavy-water production plant.
Missile Advancements
There is little doubt that Iranian missile development is well advanced. The international watchdog wants to inspect civilian workshops that have been involved in the production of model prototypes of a new payload chamber for a missile re-entry vehicle. This is likely intended for the Shahab-3 missile, which has an intended range of around 1,000 miles (1,600 km).
Iran has yet to confirm or deny if the redesign engineering and modelling studies for the chamber are for a nuclear payload.
Some information on the Iranian nuclear program has been supplied by opposition groups. When this generated IAEA questions, Tehran generally has provided limited answers or simple denials.
In May 2009, Iran test-fired a Sajjil-2 surface-to-surface solid-fuel missile in Semnan province in northern Iran, claiming it landed “precisely on target.” An earlier version was tested in November 2008. The claimed range of about 1,250 miles (2,000 km) would make the Sajjil-2 capable of reaching Israel or U.S. bases in the Middle East. That missile, said the Iranians, was equipped with a new navigation system as well as precise and sophisticated sensors.
Iran’s missile efforts have been focused on the medium-range Shahab-3, a single-stage, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. A solid-fueled ballistic missile needs highly sophisticated technology, but may be more accurate and less vulnerable to attack during fuelling.
The Next Step
Just before an early September international meeting aimed at assessing joint policy towards Iran, Tehran said it had a new proposal to offer the group, known in diplomatic jargon as the E3+3. The group consists of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and China.
Tehran called for further talks, repeating its pattern when faced with more sanctions.
The E3+3 put forward a “freeze for freeze” proposal, stipulating that the international community would stop extending sanctions if Iran ceased expanding its Natanz enrichment facility. More time was allowed for Iran’s response, which was delayed by the bloody aftermath of the Iranian presidential elections.
The next deadline for Iran is in late September. Though Tehran seems to believe otherwise, deadlines cannot be extended endlessly and patience is wearing thin in some quarters. That proved to be the case in September 2007 when Israeli aircraft attacked what was apparently a North Korean-supplied plutonium reactor in Al Kibar, Syria.
Author: Andy Oppenheimer
© 2009 Military Periscope. All rights reserved. Redistribution of content is prohibited without prior consent of Military Periscope.